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Abstract
This paper develops a theory on the complementarity in institutional qualities between the
home and host countries in bilateral FDI. Firms ‘born’ in countries with poorer institutions
tend to invest more in informal institutions to mitigate political risk. The marginal advantage
of higher informal institution endowment is bigger when the political risk at the FDI destination
is higher. Thus, all else being equal, the ranking of the MNE’s home institutions predicts the
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1 Introduction
In the FDI literature, multinational enterprises (MNEs) are often theorized to be exclusively based
in the North. The implicit rationale is that firms from the North have a universal advantage
in FDI given their leading capacity in R&D and technology or management know-how. See, for
example, Helpman (2006) for a survey of the literature. In practice, however, FDI originating from
the South is growing rapidly in recent decades: from 6% of the world FDI outflows in 1986-1990
to 17% in 2006-2010 (Dixit, 2012). The share of FDI inflows received by the developing country
from the peer South has increased even more disproportionately, from 6% in 1994 to over 36%
in 2000 (Aykut and Ratha, 2004). This trend is likely to continue, given the rising economic
weight of developing countries in the world; in 2013, FDI from developing countries (together
with transition economies) accounted for 39% of global FDI outflows (UNCTAD, 2014). While
empirically important, relatively little theoretical work has been done to formalize the rationales
of South-based MNEs and their comparative advantage. This paper aims to create a theoretical
framework for one such perspective—based on political risk and informal institution—and provide
its empirical evidence.
The theory is built on the observation that political risk is an important consideration in firms’
production choice, especially in developing countries. For example, in annual surveys of worldwide
MNEs conducted by the World Bank MIGA agency, political risk is consistently ranked as one of the
most important constraints for cross-border investments in developing countries (see MIGA, 2011,
and its other annual reports) among other considerations such as macroeconomic instability. In
addition to multilateral surveys, ad hoc incidents continue to happen that remind us of the hazards
of doing business in certain parts of the world. For example, Churchill Mining, a London-listed
firm, announced in May 2008 that it had found 150m tonnes of coal in Indonesian Borneo, soon
before its mining license was revoked by a local district chief (The Economist, 2011). In January
2013, as another example, the Japanese engineering firm JGC was caught in a terrorist attack at
gas plants in Algeria (Straits Times, 2013), with 10 Japanese killed among many other hostages.
Political risk is defined in this paper as the likelihood that political events occur and prevent
a firm from realizing its profit. The event could be an adverse regulatory change where the state
confiscates, overtly or covertly, the firm’s profits by way of transfer and convertibility restrictions,
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breach of contract, non-honoring of sovereign obligations, or expropriation. Alternatively, it could
be violent political events such as war, terrorism, or civil disturbance that cause business interrup-
tion or physical damages (MIGA, 2011). Political risk tends to be higher in countries of poorer
institutional qualities. For example, the more stable the political system, the more accountable the
public officials, the better the regulatory quality, or the stronger the rule of law, the less likely a
political-risk event will occur.
In response to political risk, firms can choose to develop firm-specific informal institutions to
mitigate the political risk should it strike the firm. Informal institutions are difficult to identify
and measure in practice, in part reflecting its various conceptualizations in the literature (Helmke
and Levitsky, 2004; North, 1990; Casson et al., 2010). They may be categorized (in parallel with
formal institutions) as political, economic, or legal. For example, informal political institutions may
take the form of personal networks (Wang, 2000), political connectedness (Fisman, 2001; Faccio,
2006), political capital (Nee and Opper, 2010), or even direct political participation (Li et al.,
2006) that help the firms communicate, represent, or protect its business interests in the political
arena, or alternatively push through bureaucratic red tapes. Informal economic institutions might
be illustrated by unofficial exchange networks (Ledeneva, 1998) or relational contracting (Mcmillan
and Woodruff, 1999). Last but not least, informal legal institutions may include private patrols,
private protection agencies or informal courts (Frye and Zhuravskaia, 2000) that substitute for
inadequate police protection or ineffective courts. Informal political and legal institutions are of
particular interest here because of their direct bearing on countering political risk.
Higher political risk (as a result of weaker formal institutions) increases the marginal benefit of
investing in informal institutions. Thus, firms ‘born’ in the South with poorer institutional qualities
will tend to invest more in informal institutions and thus are more relationship-based.1 The skills,
human capital, or networking knowledge developed at home to engage (in not necessarily structured
or organized ways) with government officials, political figures, local communities, or other business
entities enable them to reduce the objective political risk more effectively than firms from the
North when investing in the same FDI destination, all else being equal. This marginal advantage
is bigger when the objective political risk is higher. Thus, a MNE from a country with a poorer
1Some evidence or examples that informal institutions are more prevalent in environments of weaker formal
institutions are provided by Faccio (2006), Fisman (2001), Frye and Zhuravskaia (2000), Li et al. (2006), and Mcmillan
and Woodruff (1999).
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institutional quality than another MNE will tend more likely to invest in a destination with a
poorer institutional quality than the other MNE’s choice of destination. In other words, there will
be a complementarity in institutional qualities between the home and host countries in bilateral
FDI.
The theoretical framework also predicts a rich pattern of bilateral FDI flows across countries of
different institutional qualities. Depending on the model parameters such as the cost of developing
informal institutions and the wage elasticity (with respect to institutional quality), both North-
South and South-North FDI flows are possible, as firms trade off lower wages for better institutional
quality. Second, it also predicts an ordered bi-directional FDI flows for countries of intermediate
institutions, where a country receives FDI inflows from the North (in terms of institutional quality,
e.g., China from the US) and sends FDI outflows to the South (e.g., China to Algeria) until a
threshold on political risk is reached, above which FDI reverses its direction (and flows from the
extreme South to the not-so-extreme South, and in turn to the moderate South).
I assemble a dataset of bilateral FDI stocks (and flows) for 219 economies between 2001-2010
based on the UNCTAD’s Bilateral FDI Statistics, and institutional qualities using the Worldwide
Governance Indicators. The comprehensive coverage of the set of countries is important, as this
allows us to look into the behavior of FDI flows from (to) the whole spectrum of countries in
terms of institutional quality, including the South-South and South-North FDI—a less investigated
segment in the literature. I put to test the theory’s main prediction of a positive assortative
matching pattern between the home and host institutions, by regressing FDI on the level and
the interaction of institutional quality indicators of the home and host countries, in addition to
a long list of gravity variables (that control for information barriers or transaction costs), and
the home and host country-specific characteristics such as GDPs, GDPs per capita, and general
production cost levels. A positive coefficient on the institution interaction term would imply a
complementarity effect between the home and host institutional qualities, and support the paper’s
theoretical prediction. I also include the difference in GDPs per capita between the home and host
countries as a control for the Linder effect on FDI as proposed by Fajgelbaum et al. (2014).
Overall, I find very robust support for the theory’s prediction. The complementarity effect in
institutions is positive and significant, and the finding is robust to the FDI series used (inward or
outward stocks and inward or outward flows), the measurement of institution (in terms of voice and
4
accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, or control of corruption),
the estimation specification (with or without two-way time-varying country fixed effects), and the
inclusion of zero FDI observations. The coefficient estimates on the level and the interaction of
institutional qualities indicate that not all FDIs are attracted toward countries of better institu-
tions. Better institutions attract proportionally more FDIs from countries of better institutions.
A non-negligible proportion of countries with institutional qualities at the lower spectrum (below
the 33% percentile as an indicative figure) in fact choose to make FDI in destinations of relatively
poor institutional qualities. On the other hand, a better institution at home can be a disadvantage
for firms when investing in destinations of relatively poor (below the 26% percentile) institutional
qualities. The complementarity effects (and cutoffs) vary across institution indicators and robust-
ness checks, but in general the effects are stronger for institutions related to regulation and political
accountability, and weaker for political stability and absence of violence. This provides a circum-
stantial evidence on the plausible story that firms born in countries of weak regulatory quality may
find it easier to build informal institutions such as political network to deal with red tapes than
firms born in politically unstable and violence-prone countries to build informal institutions such
as private security forces to deal with civil riots or wars. To the extent that such informal institu-
tions are costly to build, we will observe weak or no complementarity effect in the corresponding
institution indicators (as in the case of political stability and absence of violence).
This paper is motivated by Dixit (2012), which suggests that similarly poor governance en-
dowments may be a source of comparative advantage for South-based MNEs when investing in
developing countries. There is a large empirical literature that studies the impact of institutional
quality or political risk in the host country on inward FDI, and most of the studies conclude with
the importance of good institutions to attract inward FDI. However, only a few isolated empirical
studies have looked at the relational difference in institutions between the home and host countries
and its impact on the pattern of bilateral FDI. For example, Darby et al. (2010) found that South
MNEs are less (or not at all) deterred by bad institutional quality in the host country than North
MNE, based on bilateral FDI count data (on the number of MNEs from a country of origin present
in a destination country). Relatedly, Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008) measured the proportion
of developing-country MNEs among the largest foreign firms in each of 50 LDCs and found that
developing-country MNEs are more prevalent in LDCs with poorer regulatory quality and lower
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control of corruption (although this negative relationship does not apply to all aspects of institu-
tional quality, e.g., rule of law). Meanwhile, studying the FDI flows into 15 Asian countries (during
1990-2005) from 111 economies in the world, Hwang (2010) found that FDI flows from fellow Asian
countries are less sensitive than non-Asian source countries to the political risk level of the host
country. Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2007) provided probably one of the most direct evidence bearing
on the topic. Using a gravity model for bilateral FDI from OECD countries to the other countries,
they found that good institutions in the host country almost always increase the amount of FDI
received; however, more interestingly, good institutions in the home country have no or even neg-
ative impact on outward FDI, and institutional distance has often a negative impact on bilateral
FDI. Last but not least, Habib and Zurawicki (2002) focused on corruption and observed that both
the corruption level in the host country and the distance in the corruption level between the home
and host countries reduce bilateral FDI flows. The findings of the above studies are to a greater or
lesser extent consistent with the current paper’s prediction of a complementarity in institutional
qualities in bilateral FDI (although the authors may not have seen or interpreted their results in
the same light). The theory developed in this paper represents one attempt to integrate this small
but growing literature. The empirical analysis of the paper complements the previous studies by
extending the country coverage (with the inclusion of almost all economies in the world) and the
empirical specification: with the use of an interaction term in line with the theory (rather than
difference often used in the literature), and the consideration of both zero and positive FDI, and
two-way multilateral effects.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I develop the theoretical model and predic-
tions. In Section 3, I present the estimation framework and findings. Section 4 discusses potential
extensions and concludes.
2 Model
Consider a monopolistic competition model, in which each firm produces an unique variety and
supplies the product to markets all over the world. Abstract away from any kind of trade frictions
in the theory such that the same price prevails in all markets. Under the assumption of identical
CES preferences, the world demand function faced by each firm is the aggregation of demand in
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all markets. Let X denote the demand of the world market:
X = AP−ε, (1)
where A indicates the size of the world market, P the world price, and ε > 1 the price elasticity of
demand.
Suppose that labor is the only input used in production. Production incurs no fixed cost but
a constant marginal cost denoted by MC ≡ wφ , where φ is the firm productivity level and w the
wage rate. In words, the marginal cost of production is decreasing in a firm’s productivity level
and increasing in the wage rate in the production location.
2.1 Choice of Informal Institution
Consider a firm born in a country and developing its informal institution in response to the political
risk facing its production. In the event that production takes place, given the monopolistically
competitive market structure, the firm sets a constant markup over its marginal cost of production,
P = εε−1MC. Substituting the price into the profit function denoted by Π, we have
Π = (P −MC)X
= Bw1−ε, (2)
where B ≡ (Aε ) [( εε−1)( 1φ)]1−ε.
The firm faces a likelihood where a political event occurs that prevents it from realizing its
profit. For example, the event could be an adverse regulatory change where the state confiscates,
overtly or covertly, the firm’s property or resources by breach of contract, non-honoring of sovereign
obligations, or expropriation. Alternatively, it could be political violence such as insurrection,
rebellion, civil disturbance, riots, terrorism, or war that disrupts the business operation. The
incidence is termed a political-risk event. The probability r of a political-risk event is hypothesized
to depend negatively on the institutional quality of a country measured in terms of: e.g., the
accountability of public officials, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality,
rule of law, or control of corruption. Countries are indexed by r, representing its underlying
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(inverse) institutional quality.
Firms choose how much to invest in firm-specific informal institutions, which can be deployed
to mitigate political risk when it strikes a firm. Let I ∈ [0, 1] denote the informal institution
developed by a firm. When a political-risk event hits the firm, with probability I, the firm can
overcome the shock, while with probability (1 − I), the bad shock remains unresolved. Thus, the
expected operating profit EΠ(I) of a firm with informal institution I is EΠ(I) = (1 − r + rI)Π,
which increases in I. Informal institution is costly to develop and maintain. Its cost function is
assumed to take the functional form C(I) = 1δ I
δ, where δ > 1. Thus, a firm maximizes its expected
profit:
max
0≤I≤1
EΠ(I)− C(I), (3)
choosing I that satisfies the first-order condition: rΠ = Iδ−1, which implies that the optimal
informal institution chosen by a firm will be:
I(r) = (rΠ)κ > 0, (4)
where κ = 1δ−1 > 0.
Assumption 1 (i) w(r) = w0r
−η where w0, η > 0, and (ii) (Bw1−ε0 ) < 1.
Assumption 1(i) captures the stylized fact that wage is in general increasing with the institu-
tional quality of a country, that is, ∂w(r)/∂r < 0. The particular functional form used implies that
the elasticity of wage with respect to institutional quality εw(r) is constant (= η). This constant
wage elasticity assumption is made for expositional simplicity. The main results of the paper will
still hold under more general functional form assumptions for w(r). Assumption 1(ii) implies that
I(r) < 1 for all r ∈ [0, 1]; that is, in equilibrium, informal institution invested by a firm will never
completely eliminate the objective political risk. This implication is a reasonable approximation of
the reality, and Assumption 1(ii) can be considered essentially a normalization parametrization.
Lemma 1 Firms operating in countries with lower institutional quality (alternatively, with higher
political risk) will invest more in informal institution (and thus are more relationship-based):
∂I(r)/∂r > 0.
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Proof. Let α ≡ η(ε− 1) > 0. Note that given Assumption 1(i), I(r) = (Bw1−ε0 )κ rκ(1+α). Taking
partial derivative of I(r) with respect to r, we have
∂I(r)
∂r
= κ(1 + α)
(
I(r)
r
)
> 0. (5)
The above equation implies that I(r) < I(1) for all r ∈ [0, 1). Since I(1) = (Bw1−ε0 )κ and κ > 0,
we have I(1) < 1 by Assumption 1(ii). This completes the proof.
In this setup, informal institution increases in r for two reasons. First, for given operating profit
Π, a higher political risk increases the marginal benefit of investing in informal institution. Second,
the operating profit Π at risk is larger in a country with a lower wage rate (but also with a higher
political risk). Thus, rΠ and hence I in (4) increases in r on both accounts.
2.2 Optimal FDI Destination
Now consider the firm’s decision on the FDI destination as FDI becomes an option (as a result of,
say, policy liberalization). As with formal institutions, informal institutions take time to build and
to be internalized in the attitudes, behaviors, and culture of a society/firm. Thus, it is assumed that
even with the possibility of FDI, firms are accustomed to (or bound by) the level of informal institu-
tion I(rh) they have developed at home given its institutional setting rh. And they take with them
the skills, experience, or knowledge required to engage (in not necessarily structured/organized
ways) with government officials, political figures, local communities, or other business entities. For
modeling simplicity, I assume that such informal institutional endowment is fully transnational
(i.e., equally effective in combatting political risk in foreign countries), but the paper’s qualitative
results would continue to hold as long as there is some degree of transnationalization of informal
institutions.
Each firm faces the following expected profit maximization problem and chooses its optimal
destination rd for FDI:
max
rd∈[0,1]
EΠF = (1− rd + rdI(rh))Π(rd), (6)
where Π(rd) ≡ Π(w(rd)) = (Bw1−ε0 )rαd . In essence, firms face the tradeoff between lower production
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cost w and lower political risk rd. The first order condition requires that:
∂EΠF (rd)
∂rd
=
Π(rd)
rd
[α− (1 + α)(1− I(rh))rd] = 0, (7)
which implies that the optimal FDI destination country is of index:
rd = min{H(I(rh)), 1}, (8)
where H(I(rh)) ≡ α(1+α)(1−I(rh)) .2 I make some further assumptions on the parameters to reduce
the taxonomy of cases. The key prediction of the paper on the complementarity between the home
and host institutions is robust to these assumptions.
Assumption 2 (1 + ξ)I(1) < 1 < ξ, where ξ ≡ κ(1 + α) > 0.
Note that the first inequality in Assumption 2 implies Assumption 1(ii), and is thus a stronger
condition. Proposition 1 summarizes the main results of the paper.
Proposition 1 (Complementarity in Institutional Qualities) (i) I(rh) is strictly increasing
and convex in rh. (ii) H(I) is strictly increasing and convex in I. (iii) Let r ≡ H(I(0)), r¯ ≡
H(I(1)), and {rˆ} = {r|r = H(I(r)), where 0 ≤ r ≤ 1}. If r¯ > 1, {rˆ} is empty. Otherwise, {rˆ} is a
singleton, and 0 < r < rˆ ≤ r¯ ≤ 1, where the equality holds when rˆ = r¯ = 1.
Proof. Proposition 1(i): Recall that I(rh) = (rhΠ(rh))
κ =
(
Bw1−ε0
)κ
rξh = I(1)r
ξ
h. It follows that
∂I(rh)
∂rh
= ξI(1)rξ−1h > 0,
∂2I(rh)
∂r2h
= ξ(ξ − 1)I(1)rξ−2h > 0,
where the second inequality follows given Assumption 2. Thus, I(rh) is an increasing convex
function of rh.
2EΠF (rd) has a single peak at rd = H(I(rh)), is strictly concave for rd > H(I(rh)) and strictly quasiconcave for
rd < H(I(rh)). In particular, ∂
2(EΠF (rd))/∂r
2
d Q 0 if and only if rd R α−1(1+α)(1−I(rh)) .
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Proposition 1(ii): Given the definition of H(I) = α(1+α)(1−I) , it is straightforward to verify that
∂H(I)
∂I
=
H(I)
(1− I) > 0,
∂2H(I)
∂I2
=
2H(I)
(1− I)2 > 0.
The result thus follows.
Proposition 1(iii): By definition, r = α1+α , r¯ =
α
(1+α)(1−I(1)) , and rˆ satisfies
rˆ
(
1− I(1)rˆξ
)
=
α
1 + α
.
Let LHS(r) ≡ r (1− I(1)rξ), and RHS(r) ≡ α1+α . It is straightforward to verify that LHS(r) is
strictly increasing in r for r ∈ [0, 1] as
∂LHS(r)
∂r
= 1− (1 + ξ)I(1)rξ > 0,
since r ≤ 1 and (1 + ξ)I(1) < 1 given Assumption 2. Because LHS(0) = 0, and LHS(r) is strictly
increasing in r for r ∈ [0, 1], there exists a unique solution for rˆ if and only if LHS(1) ≥ RHS(1).
This condition is equivalent to r¯ ≤ 1. When r¯ = 1, it follows that LHS(1) = RHS(1) and rˆ = 1.
This completes the proof.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the mapping in institutions between the home and host countries. For
example, a firm born in country A will develop an informal institution of level I(rA) and choose
to undertake FDI in country A′ with an institutional setting H(I(rA)) = rA′ . The curves I(rh)
and H(I) slope upward and are convex in their respective arguments. In Figure 1 (scenario a),
r¯ ≡ H(I(1)) > 1 and the schedule H(I) does not intersect with the schedule I(rh); on the other
hand, in Figure 2 (scenario b), r¯ ≡ H(I(1)) < 1 and H(I) intersects with I(rh) once from above
at rˆ. Regardless of the scenarios, Proposition 1 implies that a MNE from a country with a lower
institutional quality than another MNE will invest in a destination with a lower institutional quality
than the other MNE’s choice of destination. For example, compare the mapping between country
B and B′ versus country A and A′, and those between country C and C ′ versus country D and
D′. In other words, there exists a complementarity in institutional qualities between the home and
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host countries.
If Assumption 2 does not hold, the schedule I(rh) is not necessarily convex and there could be
more than one cutoff rˆ in scenario (a), but the main result on the institutional complementarity is
robust. In fact, the result necessarily holds if I(rh) and H(I) are both increasing functions, which
is true given Lemma 1 and the definition of H(I).
Focusing on the scenarios implied by Proposition 1, we can summarize the choice of FDI desti-
nations by MNEs as follows.
Lemma 2 (North-South or South-North FDI) (a) If rˆ does not exist for a given productivity
level φ, firms φ from all countries undertake FDI in a country with poorer institutional qualities
(North-South FDI). (b) If rˆ exists for a given productivity level φ, firms φ from countries with
rh < rˆ undertake North-South FDI, while firms from countries with rh > rˆ undertake FDI in a
country with better institutional qualities (South-North FDI).
Proof. (a) By Proposition 1(iii), if rˆ does not exist, it follows that LHS(r) < α1+α for r ∈ [0, 1],
which implies that rd = min{H(I(rh)), 1} > rh for all rh < 1. (b) By the same proposition,
if rˆ exists, then LHS(r) < α1+α for r < rˆ and LHS(r) >
α
1+α for r > rˆ, which implies that
rd = H(I(rh)) > rh for rh < rˆ and rd = H(I(rh)) < rh for rh > rˆ.
In essence, MNEs trade off lower wage for better institutional quality in choosing FDI destina-
tions, given their endowment of informal institution. When the political risk constraint is mild, we
see that firms are attracted toward the South (as in A to A′ and B to B′). However, MNEs may
indeed invest in the North relative to home (as in C to C ′ and D to D′), when the political risk
constraint is binding, in which case, there is a tendency for FDI to flock to the ‘middle countries’
of intermediate institutional conditions.
Lemma 3 (Uni- or Bi-directional FDI Flows) Countries with r ∈ [r, r¯]\{rˆ} are characterized
by FDI flows in both directions by firms of a given productivity level. On the other hand, countries
with r < r or r > r¯ see only FDI outflows but no FDI inflows by firms of a given productivity level.
Proof. This is evident since the countries that will receive FDI are those with r ∈ [r, r¯], the range
of H(I), while all countries r ∈ [0, 1] could potentially undertake FDI.
I elaborate on the potential two-way FDI flows indicated by Lemma 3. In scenario (a), countries
are partitioned into two disjoint subsets: R∅S ≡ [0, r), and RNS ≡ [r, 1], where the first superscript
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indicates the institutional ranking of the source country of FDI inflows relative to country r, while
the second superscript the institutional ranking of the destination country of FDI outflows relative to
country r. A superscript S indicates that FDI inflows (outflows) originate from (go to) a country
of lower institutional quality, while a superscript N a country of better institutional quality. A
superscript ∅ is used when country r receives no FDI inflows (or does not invest abroad). See,
for example, points A ∈ R∅S and B ∈ RNS in Figure 1. Country A receives no FDI inflows but
invests in a institutionally relatively backward country A′, while country B = A′ receives FDI from
a relatively advanced country A and invests in a relatively backward country B′. In scenario (b),
countries are partitioned instead into four disjoint subsets: R∅S ≡ [0, r), RNS ≡ [r, rˆ), RSN ≡ [rˆ, r¯),
and R∅N ≡ [r¯, 1]. Points C ∈ R∅N and D ∈ RSN in Figure 2 illustrate the direction of the FDI
flows: While country C receives no FDI inflows but invest in a relatively advanced country C ′,
country D = C ′ receives FDI from a relatively backward country C and invests in a relatively
advanced country D′.
The analysis so far takes the firm productivity level as given and derives the optimal FDI
destination given the firm’s home institutional quality. As shown in the Math Appendix, an increase
in firm productivity φ will lead to a rightward shift of the I(rh) schedule for all rh ∈ (0, 1] (and the
rightward shift is bigger for higher rh), while leaving I(0) and the whole schedule H(I) unchanged.
Intuitively, a more productive firm will produce at a larger scale and hence has more at stake,
which prompts it to invest more in informal institution to counter political shock.3 The larger
informal institution in turn allows a more productive firm to locate its FDI in a country of relatively
poorer institutional quality, all else being equal, and the differentiation in I across firms is bigger
in countries of higher political risk rh. Thus, given a distribution G(φ; rh) of firm productivity
levels φ in a country rh, it will imply a distribution F (rd; rh) of institutional qualities rd of FDI
destinations from the source country rh (and the distribution F (·; rh) will be more diverse with
a larger rh). This provides another layer of assortative matching between the firm productivity
level and the destination institutional quality. In the current paper given FDI data at the country
level, I will only be able to test the matching pattern at the country level; the difference across
countries in firm productivity distributions (and their means) is left to be captured in a crude way
by county-specific variables (such as GDPs per capita or fixed effects).
3Faccio (2006), for example, shows that political connections are more widespread among larger firms.
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3 Empirical Evidence
The central question I seek to address is whether bilateral FDI follows the assortative mapping
pattern predicted by Proposition 1 and illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. In words, the theory predicts
that a MNE may invest in a destination (d) of arbitrarily higher or lower institutional quality than
its home country (h), so both South-North and North-South FDI are possible. However, relative
to another MNE of similar characteristics but from a country of different institutional quality, the
ranking of the MNE’s home institutions predicts the ranking of their FDI destination institutions.
That is, a MNE from a country with a lower institutional quality than another MNE, will tend
more likely to invest in a destination with a lower institutional quality than the other MNE’s choice
of destination, all else being equal. This key prediction of complementarity in institutional quality
is tested by including the level and the interaction of the institutional qualities of the home and
destination countries as part of the determinants of bilateral FDI, as highlighted in (9).
ln(FDIijt) = β0 + β1 ln(gdpi,t−1) + β2 ln(gdpj,t−1) + β3 ln(gdppci,t−1) + β4 ln(gdppcj,t−1)
+β5| ln(gdppci,t−1)− ln(gdppcj,t−1)|+ β6 ln(pi,t−1) + β7 ln(pj,t−1)
+β8Gi,t−1 + β9Gj,t−1 + β10(Gi,t−1 ∗Gj,t−1)+ γXij,t−1 + ijt, (9)
where FDIijt denotes FDI in country i from country j in year t. This specification implies that
the marginal impact of the destination institution Gi,t−1 on FDI is
∂ ln(FDIijt)/∂Gi,t−1 = β8 + β10Gj,t−1, (10)
which is increasing in the home institutional quality and consistent with the theoretical prediction
of Proposition 1 if β10 > 0. That is, as one country moves up the institutional quality ladder, it
will attract more FDI only from countries of sufficiently good institutions such that Gj,t−1 > Gˆj ≡
−β8/β10 and the FDI increment is more from countries of higher institutional qualities. Seen from
a different perspective, the marginal impact of the home institution Gj,t−1 on FDI,
∂ ln(FDIijt)/∂Gj,t−1 = β9 + β10Gi,t−1, (11)
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is increasing in the destination institutional quality and consistent with Proposition 1 if β10 > 0.
A country of better institutions may not gain an advantage in investing unless the destination is of
sufficiently good institutions such that Gi,t−1 > Gˆi ≡ −β9/β10, and the advantage is stronger with
better destination institutions. In sum, a positive sign of β10 suggests a relational matching pattern
in FDI in terms of institutions, supporting the paper’s main hypothesis. An insignificant β10, on
the other hand, implies a uniform impact of home or destination institutions on FDI, regardless of
the FDI parnter country’s institution, contradicting Proposition 1.
In developing the theoretical model, I have abstracted away from many potentially important
determinants of FDI suggested in the literature. I control for them in (9). This includes the
economic size of the home and host countries, measured by their gross domestic products (GDP),
the income level of the two countries, measured by their GDPs per capita, and the business operating
costs of the two countries, measured by their general price levels. Globerman and Shapiro (2002)
provide some of the economic interpretations for how these variables may or may not affect FDI. I
also include a long list of bilateral variables X, typically used in the gravity literature, to measure
the extent of transaction or information barriers: such as distance, contiguity, common language,
colonial relationship, regional trade agreement (RTA), and currency union (CU). To this list I add
bilateral investment treaty (BIT), as in the context of FDI, the presence of BIT may affect the
political risk perception of MNEs and the FDI pattern as a result.
A recent study by Fajgelbaum et al. (2014) proposes a Linder hypothesis for FDI, i.e., MNEs
will tend to invest in countries of similar income per capita, due to non-homothetic preferences
and proximity-versus-concentration tradeoff in serving foreign markets. In (9), I include the same
measure as in their study, the absolute value of the difference in log-per capita income between
home and host country, to control for this potential effect.
ln(FDIijt) = β0 + β5| ln(gdppci,t−1)− ln(gdppcj,t−1)|+ β10(Gi,t−1 ∗Gj,t−1)
+γXij,t−1 + λi,t + θj,t + ijt. (12)
Following Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), it has become a regular practice in the gravity
literature of trade to control for the multilateral resistance to trade of the exporting and the
importing country. Several trade models have since derived different theoretical foundations for
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such multilateral effects; see for example, Eaton and Kortum (2002), Helpman et al. (2008) and
Chaney (2008). The theoretical foundations for a gravity model of FDI are not as well established,
although recently Head and Ries (2008) and de Sousa and Lochard (2011) have developed models
for bilateral FDI that bear close resemblance to the gravity equations for trade, suggesting the
presence of multilateral home and host country effects. In view of this, I consider a second empirical
specification, (12), which includes destination country by year and home country by year fixed
effects (λi,t, θj,t). The two-way fixed effects are allowed to vary by year given the panel data
structure. This alternative specification has its pros and cons. On one hand, it reduces the concern
of estimation bias due to omitted variables that are home-country-year or destination-country-year
specific. For example, the corporate tax rate of the home and the host country may affect FDI but
are omitted from (9); the two-way fixed effects in (12) control for all such omitted variables. On
the other hand, this alternative specification does not allow us to separately identify the effects of
variables that vary by home/destination country and year, such as GDP, GDP per capita, and the
level of institutional quality, which are of interest by themselves. In addition, the set of dummies for
{it} and {jt} can become very large for a large panel dataset. This poses a problem for estimation
methods that rely on numerical optimization, such as Tobit to account for zero FDI. Thus, I will
rely on (9) as the benchmark for inferences and use (12) as a robustness check wherever feasible.
3.1 Data and Measurement
The FDI data are based on the UNCTAD’s Bilateral FDI Statistics, which consists of 206 economies
reporting their FDI inward stock, outward stock, inward flows, and outward flows (in current US
dollars) for year 2001-2012 with respect to each of the partner countries. The set of partner
countries ever recorded includes 193 economies, 13 of them not in the set of reporters.4 This
dataset is comprehensive in terms of country coverage, including poor and institutionally weak
countries as FDI source or destination countries. This is an advantage, as it allows us to look into
the less investigated spectrum of South-South or South-North FDI.
In the UNCTAD’s Bilateral FDI Statistics, the FDI inward stock (flows) reported by the re-
cipient country is not necessarily equal to the FDI outward stock (flows) reported by the origin
country. Thus, without taking a stand on the direction or degree of measurement errors, I measure
4http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx
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FDIijt based on each of these four series alternately as robustness checks. The raw data differenti-
ate between missing data (data that are not available or are not separately reported, indicated by
two dots (..)) and zero data (where the item is equal to zero or negligible; indicated by dash (-)).
The pattern of zero or missing FDI data also suggests some degrees of measurement errors (e.g.,
the recipient country reports zero FDI while the origin country reports missing or positive FDI).
Having no convincing way of correcting the data, I choose to use only the positive (and zero) FDI
entries, and treat the missing FDI entries as literally missing and drop them from the analysis.5
I measure a country’s institutional quality based on the Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI), 2013 Update, in six dimensions: voice and accountability (VA), political stability and ab-
sence of violence (PV), government effectiveness (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL),
and control of corruption (CC).6 Details on the interpretation of the indicators can be found in
Kaufmann et al. (2010). Since these indicators are highly correlated with one another, I include
them one at a time in the estimation of (9) and (12). For each governance indicator, a country
receives both a point estimate, ranging from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), and a per-
centile ranking among all countries. I report the results based on the point estimate, although the
results are qualitatively similar based on the percentile ranking.
The data on GDP and GDP per capita (in current US dollars) are retrieved from the World
Development Indicators.7 I then construct the general price level of a country relative to the United
States by the ratio of its GDP (per capita) in current US dollars to its GDP (per capita) in current
PPP dollars. This variable aims to capture the overall cost of production (including, e.g., rent,
wages, intermediate materials and infrastructure) facing the firms operating in the country.
The transportation and information cost proxies X are compiled from several sources. The
CEPII website provides the data on bilateral distance, and whether two countries are contiguous
(contig), share a common language (comlang), have ever had a colonial link (colony), have had a
common colonizer after 1945 (comcol), are currently in a colonial relationship (curcol) or were/are
the same country (smctry).8 The data on whether two countries are currently in a regional trade
5I also drop the negative FDI entries from the analysis, as they cannot be accounted for by the current theoretical
or empirical framework.
6http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators.
7http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (22-Jul-2014 update).
8http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd modele/presentation.asp?id=6. See Mayer and Zignago (2011) for further
details. I corrected some coding errors of smctry in the original data, wherever they were not symmetric for the same
country pair ij and ji based on the information in http://www.worldstatesmen.org/, which is the same source used
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agreement (rta for 1958-2014), and using a common currency (comcur for 1948-2009) are retrieved
from de Sousa’s website.9 Last but not least, the data on bilateral investment treaties are obtained
from UNCTAD. I construct a dummy variable that equals one if a BIT is currently in force between
a country pair and zero otherwise, according to the date a BIT enters into force (and the date it is
terminated if ever).10
All regressors (if time variant) are lagged one period relative to the FDI variable, to reduce the
concern of reverse causality. I also experiment using longer lags of the right-hand-side variables in
unreported exercises, but the results are similar.
In sum, the study covers bilateral FDI stocks (flows) for 219 economies during 2001-2010, with
attrition in the sample size due to missing entries or gaps in the data. The effective sample varies
depending on the estimation specification used and the FDI series under study.11
3.2 Results
I estimate specifications (9) and (12) first using only positive FDI observations based on the ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) estimation method, and subsequently using both positive and zero FDI
observations based on the Tobit estimation method a` la Eaton and Kortum (2001).
3.2.1 Positive bilateral FDI
Table 1 presents the OLS estimation result of (9) for FDI inward stock (reported by the recipient
country). As shown by the table, the coefficient on the institution interaction term (Gd ∗ Gh) is
positive and significant regardless of the indicators used to measure institutional quality, consistent
with the implications of Proposition 1. Table 2 summarizes the results when the FDI outward
stock, inflows, or outflows are used instead to measure the FDI activity. The sign of the coefficient
by the original data to create the variable. Details on the entries corrected are available upon request.
9http://jdesousa.univ.free.fr/data.htm. See also de Sousa (2012).
10The data were retrieved from the UNCTAD website in June 2013. The interface has since been migrated to
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA. I corrected the original data downloaded in cases where BIT entries on
one side are missing or where the dates of entry into force are inconsistent between two BIT partner countries. The
corrections are made based on the updated information provided in the above website. I set the cutoff date to be
July 1st of a year in defining the year-varying bit dummy.
11The whole set of 219 economies consists of 206 reporting countries and 13 partner countries that did not appear as
reporting countries. The FDI series used are truncated in year 2010, because the data on currency union is available
only up to 2009. Gaps in the data, for example, occur in the governance indicators, which are not available for
year 2001. Missing data arise mainly due to the dependent variable, although different country coverage across data
sources leads to missing data on the independent variables as well. Specification (12) does not require observations
on country-specific variables, which explains the bigger sample size in estimations with two-way fixed effects.
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on (Gd ∗ Gh) is significantly positive and amazingly robust across all FDI series and institution
indicators (except perhaps PV). The Linder hypothesis for FDI proposed by Fajgelbaum et al.
(2014) is also supported overall by the data on FDI stock; the evidence for it is weaker in cases of
FDI flows.
We can calculate the lower bound Gˆh implied by (10) for the home country that will be attracted
by a better institution at the destination given the coefficient estimates of Gd and (Gd ∗ Gh) in
Table 2. As an indication, the median of this cutoff across all institution indicators and FDI series
in Table 2 is −0.43. This corresponds to approximately 0.43 standard deviation below the mean
of the institutional quality distribution across countries.12 Thus, not all FDIs are attracted toward
countries of better institutions. Better institutions attract proportionally more FDIs from countries
of better institutions. A non-negligible proportion of countries with institutional qualities at the
lower spectrum (Φ(−0.43) ≈ 0.33 using standardized normal distribution as an approximation) in
fact choose to make FDI in destinations of relatively poor institutional quality. On the other hand,
the median of the corresponding cutoff Gˆd suggested by (11) is −0.64 based on the coefficient
estimates of Gh and (Gd ∗ Gh) in Table 2. This highlights the fact that a better institution at
home can be a disadvantage for firms when investing in destinations of relatively poor institutional
qualities (Φ(−0.64) ≈ 0.26).
I take the strength of the complementarity between home and host country institutions as
reflecting the possibility for firms to build firm-specific informal institutions to reduce political risk.
The strongest complementarity is observed for RQ and weakest for PV in Table 2. This suggests that
firms born in countries of weak regulatory quality may find it easier to build informal institutions
such as political network to deal with red tapes than firms born in politically unstable and violence-
prone countries to build informal institutions such as private security forces to deal with civil riots,
terrorism, or wars. To the extent that such informal institutions are too costly, we will not observe
the complementarity effect. This is illustrated by the case of PV given FDI outward stock (flows),
where the sign for the coefficient on Gd is positive and for (Gd ∗ Gh) insignificant, indicating a
universal preference for a politically more stable host country. Without the complementarity, the
positive sign for the coefficient on Gh also implies that firms coming from a politically more stable
country has a universal advantage in outward FDI, other things being equal.
12The WGI governance indicators have approximately a zero mean and unit standard deviation.
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Refer back to Table 1. Most of the other coefficients are precisely estimated and consistent with
ex ante theoretical predictions. A larger home or host market size, a lower production cost at the
destination and a higher production cost at home, physical proximity, common language, colonial
relationship, and currency union all help raise bilateral FDI stock.
Richer countries (of higher GDP per capita) receives less FDI, contrary to what some FDI
theories may suggest based on consumer purchasing powers. This result based on FDI inward
stock, however, turns out to be sensitive to the FDI series studied: the sign is generally positive
and significant for FDI inflows/outflows but insignificant for FDI outward stock. This discrepancy
in findings may not be surprising as GDP per capita can reflect, for example, productivity levels
but also factor prices, which work in opposite directions in influencing FDI. Thus, its net effect on
FDI is an empirical question. Although I have used the general price level to control for production
cost, it may not have fully captured the factor price variation across countries.
Regional trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties do not have robust positive effects
on bilateral FDI. In fact, ironically, BIT is shown to have a negative (and statistically significant)
effect on inward FDI stock; similar results are found using FDI outward stock or FDI flows. This
result, however, is not robust to the inclusion of fixed effects or zero FDI observations, as will be
shown later.
Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates for specification (12) with two-way (time-varying) fixed
effects included in the regression, based on FDI inward stock. Overall, the results are similar to
the benchmark in Table 1. The institution interaction term continues to be positive and significant
(except in the case of PV), showing a complementarity effect between home and host country
institutions. The Linder hypothesis for FDI is now clearly supported by the data. Most of the
other variables have qualitatively similar effects on FDI as in the benchmark, although some lose
their significance (such as currency union) while others become statistically significant (such as
regional trade agreements). The BIT is now shown to have insignificant (rather than negative)
effect on bilateral FDI.
Table 4 summarizes the results with FE controls for all FDI series. The findings are quite similar
regardless of the FDI series used (in stock or flows, reported by the recipient or the country of origin).
The institutional complementarity effect is statistically significant overall. The effect tends to be
stronger for VA, GE and RQ, weaker for RL and CC, and absent for PV. This pattern suggests an
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interesting interpretation of the areas where informal institutions are feasible and prevalent, and
where they are not. The Linder hypothesis for FDI continues to hold. The results for the other
variables (unreported) are also similar across FDI series, although with some variations in their
statistical significance: one robust difference from the benchmark is that the coefficient on RTA
now becomes statistically positive with the FE controls.
3.2.2 Zero augmented bilateral FDI
This section presents the result of Tobit estimation using both zero and positive FDI observations.
This is implemented by the STATA intreg command, with the left censoring point set at the
minimum positive value observed of the FDI series under study.13 This is first done for specification
(9) without the FE controls. As shown in Table 5 for FDI inward stock, the coefficient estimates for
most variables increase in magnitude, as may be expected given that OLS estimates of truncated
data tend to be downward biased toward zero. The coefficient on (Gd ∗ Gh) now roughly doubles
and is unambiguously significant and positive regardless of the institution indicator. As shown in
Table 6, the strong evidence for the complementarity effect in institutions is robust to the changes
in the FDI series used. Overall, the complementarity effect is still the strongest in terms of VA,
GE and RQ, and the weakest in terms of PV, with RL and CC somewhere in between. Given
the coefficient estimates on Gd, Gh, and (Gd ∗ Gh), we can again calculate the lower bound Gˆh
for an increase in Gd to attract FDI from countries above the threshold, and Gˆd for an increase
in Gh to increase the home firm’s FDI in destinations above the threshold. The median of these
cutoffs across all FDI series and institution indicators are 0.19 for Gˆh and −0.49 for Gˆd, indicating
generally higher cutoffs (in standard deviations of the institutional quality distribution) than in the
benchmark. This is consistent with the above finding of a stronger complementarity effect given
the Tobit estimation.
The evidence in Table 6 for the Linder hypothesis is not as overwhelming across the board;
it is generally stronger for the FDI stock, and weaker or absent for the FDI flows, similar to the
benchmark. As shown in Table 5, the sign of BIT now turns around and becomes significantly
positive with the inclusion of zero FDI observations. This indicates the importance of BIT at
driving the extensive margin (rather than the intensive margin) of FDI relations. The same is
13That is $2000 US dollars for the FDI outward flows and $1 million US dollars for the other three FDI series.
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observed when the other FDI series (unreported) are used. By the estimates in Table 5, signing
a BIT would increase the latent bilateral inward FDI stock by around 30%, which is economically
significant.
I conduct the last robustness check by allowing both two-way fixed effects and zero FDI obser-
vations. As discussed earlier, this poses some difficulties for estimation methods based on numerical
optimization such as Tobit, as the number of dummy variables for FE increases rapidly with the
number of countries and years (206 reporting countries and 193 partner countries, multiplied by
10 years, although the actual number is smaller with missing data). The estimation algorithm
intreg in Stata cannot produce variance estimates in some cases. I verify the results with the tobit
algorithm. The point estimates are arbitrarily close to those of intreg, but the variance estimates
are still missing for some cases and not necessarily in the same cases as with intreg. This led me to
conjecture that the missing variance is not necessarily a statistical, but a numerical, result. In view
of this, I will take a conservative approach when interpreting the estimation results by focusing on
the cases without missing (or incredibly large) variance estimates.
Table 7 presents the results for FDI inward stock. The RQ equation cannot be precisely es-
timated for all variables, while the variance estimate is missing for the Linder term in the VA
equation and for the institution interaction term in the GE equation. Nonetheless, all the point
estimates are quite similar across equations of different institution indicators, and are of expected
signs. Proximity, contiguity, common language, colonial relationship, being/having been the same
country, regional trade agreements, currency union, and bilateral investment treaties all help raise
potential FDI activities. Compared to Table 3, all variables increase in their magnitude of impact
with the inclusion of zero FDI observations and some by a large amount, suggesting the importance
of these variables at affecting the extensive margin of FDI.
Table 8 summarizes the results on the Linder effect and the institutional complementarity effect
for all FDI series. The Linder hypothesis for FDI holds in general, except in the case of FDI outward
stock where the variance estimate is missing for several equations. We see an overall robust evidence
for the institutional complementarity effect, except PV where the effect is weak or absent. The
findings for the other regressors based on different FDI series (unreported) are also more or less
the same as presented in Table 7.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, I propose a theory on a positive assortative matching pattern between the home and
destination institutional qualities in bilateral FDI flows. This theory formalizes the perspective on
the comparative advantage of South-based MNEs to deal with politically uncertain and relationship-
based investment environment, relative to their peers from the North. This helps explain the
greater presence of South-based MNEs in countries of relatively poorer institutions documented
by several studies in the literature. I conduct an extensive econometric test of this hypothesis
using bilateral FDI for 219 economies during year 2001-2010. The results indicate a statistically
significant complementarity effect between the home and destination institutional qualities, robust
to the FDI series studied (in stock or flows, reported by the recipient or the country of origin), the
institution indicators used, the inclusion of two-way multilateral effects, and the consideration of
zero FDI. The effect tends to be stronger with the inclusion of zero FDI and for the dimensions
of institutions where the scope for firms to build informal institutions (to counter the associated
political risk) is bigger, which is in line with the proposed theoretical mechanism and implications.
The paper’s theoretical framework also suggests some additional interesting testable predictions.
First, there will be a reverse assortative matching pattern between the productivity of a firm and
the institutional quality of its choice of FDI destination, all else being equal. This implies a mapping
from the firm productivity distribution of a home country to a distribution of FDI destinations in
terms of institutional qualities. Second, given the same spread of firm productivity, the spread of
institutional qualities of FDI destinations will be larger for a source country of higher political risk
(or worse institutional quality). I leave the examination of these hypotheses to future work with
firm-level FDI data.
The idea of informal institution has been modeled in this paper in a simplistic reduced form.
In reality, it likely embodies many facets of firm-specific cultures and capacities growing out of
a society’s political structure and social conditions. The rich fabric and informal nature of these
human, social, and political capitals (with some discussed in the introduction) are difficult to
measure in mathematical terms but represent an interesting avenue to understand the incentives
and constraints of firms born in developing countries, and their comparative advantages when
venturing abroad. Further theoretical and empirical analysis of the mechanisms through which
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firms’ informal institutional endowment transcends national borders would also help us identify the
factors determining the strength of its transnationalization.
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Math Appendix
Comparative Static Analysis of φ Use the definitions of I(r), H(I), r, r¯ and rˆ, respectively,
we can show that
∂I(r)
∂φ
=
 0 if r = 0κ(ε− 1) I(r)φ > 0 if r ∈ (0, 1] ,
∂H(I)
∂φ
= 0,
∂r
∂φ
= 0,
∂r¯
∂φ
= κ(ε− 1) r¯
φ
I(1)
(1− I(1)) > 0,
∂rˆ
∂φ
= κ(ε− 1) rˆ
φ
I(rˆ)
(1− (1 + ξ)I(rˆ)) > 0.
Thus, an increase in φ will lead to a rightward shift of the I(r) schedule for all r ∈ (0, 1] (and the
rightward shift is bigger for higher r), while leaving I(0) and the whole schedule H(I) unchanged.
This implies that firms of higher productivity levels in each country invest more in I and choose to
locate their FDI in countries of relatively poorer institutional qualities. In Figure 1, the partition
of countries is not affected. In Figure 2, R∅S remains unchanged (since ∂r/∂φ = 0), RNS expands
(since ∂rˆ/∂φ > 0), and R∅N shrinks (since ∂r¯/∂φ > 0). The impact on RSN is ambiguous.
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Figure 1: Mapping in Institutions between Home and Host Countries. Scenario (a)
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Figure 2: Mapping in Institutions between Home and Host Countries. Scenario (b)
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Table 1: Positive bilateral FDI—inward stock reported by the recipient country
FDI inward stock VA PV GE RQ RL CC
ln(gdpd) 0.586
∗∗∗ 0.617 ∗∗∗ 0.565 ∗∗∗ 0.581 ∗∗∗ 0.584 ∗∗∗ 0.584 ∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
ln(gdph) 0.449
∗∗∗ 0.477 ∗∗∗ 0.437 ∗∗∗ 0.449 ∗∗∗ 0.451 ∗∗∗ 0.454 ∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
ln(gdppcd) -0.029 -0.143
∗∗ -0.146 ∗∗∗ -0.148 ∗∗∗ -0.138 ∗∗ -0.159 ∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.056) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.053)
ln(gdppch) 0.262
∗∗∗ 0.165 ∗∗∗ 0.091 0.172 ∗∗∗ 0.099 ∗ 0.082
(0.054) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.056)
|D. ln(gdppc)| -0.125 ∗∗∗ -0.179 ∗∗∗ -0.066 ∗ -0.035 -0.073 ∗ -0.098 ∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.037)
ln(pd) -0.088 -0.088 -0.271
∗∗ -0.303 ∗∗ -0.301 ∗∗ -0.342 ∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.120) (0.125) (0.125) (0.124) (0.124)
ln(ph) 0.840
∗∗∗ 1.080 ∗∗∗ 0.932 ∗∗∗ 1.020 ∗∗∗ 0.879 ∗∗∗ 0.856 ∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.132) (0.136) (0.136) (0.133) (0.132)
Gd -0.124
∗∗ 0.167 ∗∗∗ 0.150 ∗∗ 0.164 ∗∗ 0.168 ∗∗ 0.224 ∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.049) (0.072) (0.080) (0.066) (0.059)
Gh 0.097
∗ 0.175 ∗∗∗ 0.257 ∗∗∗ 0.017 0.290 ∗∗∗ 0.310 ∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.047) (0.059) (0.069) (0.060) (0.050)
Gd ∗Gh 0.267 ∗∗∗ 0.082 ∗ 0.298 ∗∗∗ 0.400 ∗∗∗ 0.283 ∗∗∗ 0.210 ∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.042) (0.045) (0.055) (0.045) (0.034)
ln(distance) -0.486 ∗∗∗ -0.491 ∗∗∗ -0.525 ∗∗∗ -0.517 ∗∗∗ -0.509 ∗∗∗ -0.522 ∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
contig. 0.535 ∗∗∗ 0.513 ∗∗∗ 0.552 ∗∗∗ 0.567 ∗∗∗ 0.560 ∗∗∗ 0.531 ∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.130) (0.128) (0.129) (0.129) (0.128)
comlang 1.164 ∗∗∗ 1.204 ∗∗∗ 1.100 ∗∗∗ 1.145 ∗∗∗ 1.106 ∗∗∗ 1.049 ∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.089) (0.088) (0.088) (0.089) (0.088)
colony 0.876 ∗∗∗ 0.887 ∗∗∗ 0.898 ∗∗∗ 0.894 ∗∗∗ 0.892 ∗∗∗ 0.870 ∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.135) (0.134) (0.133) (0.136) (0.133)
comcol 0.417 ∗∗∗ 0.468 ∗∗∗ 0.313 ∗∗ 0.362 ∗∗∗ 0.337 ∗∗∗ 0.346 ∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.127) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123)
curcol 0.484 0.587 ∗ 0.736 ∗∗ 0.648 ∗∗ 0.735 ∗∗ 0.988 ∗∗∗
(0.330) (0.328) (0.349) (0.313) (0.345) (0.370)
smctry 0.165 0.089 0.126 0.145 0.187 0.202
(0.229) (0.228) (0.225) (0.227) (0.227) (0.225)
rta 0.030 0.154 ∗∗ 0.007 -0.017 0.037 0.064
(0.080) (0.078) (0.076) (0.078) (0.077) (0.076)
comcur 0.713 ∗∗∗ 0.739 ∗∗∗ 0.756 ∗∗∗ 0.745 ∗∗∗ 0.710 ∗∗∗ 0.746 ∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.146) (0.145) (0.142) (0.146) (0.144)
bit -0.176 ∗∗∗ -0.229 ∗∗∗ -0.163 ∗∗∗ -0.212 ∗∗∗ -0.157 ∗∗ -0.110 ∗
(0.064) (0.064) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062)
# Observations 24974 24959 24970 24970 24974 24970
R2 0.528 0.525 0.539 0.535 0.537 0.541
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country-pairs are reported in the parenthesis. The
entry ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
All regressors (if time variant) are lagged one period relative to the FDI variable. |D. ln(gdppc)|
is a shorthand for | ln(gdppci,t−1)− ln(gdppcj,t−1)|.
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Table 2: Positive bilateral FDI—all stocks and flows
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
FDI inward stock:
|D. ln(gdppc)| -0.125 ∗∗∗ -0.179 ∗∗∗ -0.066 ∗ -0.035 -0.073 ∗ -0.098 ∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.037)
Gd -0.124
∗∗ 0.167 ∗∗∗ 0.150 ∗∗ 0.164 ∗∗ 0.168 ∗∗ 0.224 ∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.049) (0.072) (0.080) (0.066) (0.059)
Gh 0.097
∗ 0.175 ∗∗∗ 0.257 ∗∗∗ 0.017 0.290 ∗∗∗ 0.310 ∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.047) (0.059) (0.069) (0.060) (0.050)
Gd ∗Gh 0.267 ∗∗∗ 0.082 ∗ 0.298 ∗∗∗ 0.400 ∗∗∗ 0.283 ∗∗∗ 0.210 ∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.042) (0.045) (0.055) (0.045) (0.034)
# Observations 24974 24959 24970 24970 24974 24970
R2 0.528 0.525 0.539 0.535 0.537 0.541
FDI outward stock:
|D. ln(gdppc)| -0.087 ∗∗ -0.168 ∗∗∗ -0.053 -0.033 -0.081 ∗ -0.093 ∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.043) (0.042) (0.041)
Gh 0.053 0.281
∗∗∗ 0.323 ∗∗∗ 0.029 0.428 ∗∗∗ 0.533 ∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.055) (0.067) (0.079) (0.066) (0.055)
Gd 0.165
∗∗∗ 0.121 ∗∗ 0.121 0.235 ∗∗∗ 0.100 0.130 ∗∗
(0.058) (0.054) (0.076) (0.083) (0.069) (0.062)
Gd ∗Gh 0.270 ∗∗∗ 0.018 0.273 ∗∗∗ 0.348 ∗∗∗ 0.215 ∗∗∗ 0.184 ∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.046) (0.047) (0.058) (0.046) (0.034)
# Observations 22793 22782 22793 22793 22793 22793
R2 0.522 0.516 0.528 0.525 0.525 0.535
FDI inward flow:
|D. ln(gdppc)| -0.050 ∗ -0.085 ∗∗∗ 0.060 ∗ 0.053 0.010 0.016
(0.028) (0.028) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.032)
Gd -0.103
∗∗ 0.214 ∗∗∗ -0.162 ∗∗ -0.066 -0.092 0.024
(0.051) (0.046) (0.069) (0.076) (0.064) (0.057)
Gh 0.097
∗∗ 0.076 ∗ 0.092 ∗ 0.007 0.207 ∗∗∗ 0.130 ∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.045) (0.053) (0.062) (0.054) (0.044)
Gd ∗Gh 0.248 ∗∗∗ 0.133 ∗∗∗ 0.395 ∗∗∗ 0.444 ∗∗∗ 0.289 ∗∗∗ 0.263 ∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.038) (0.044) (0.055) (0.044) (0.033)
# Observations 19414 19403 19407 19407 19414 19407
R2 0.422 0.421 0.432 0.430 0.427 0.431
FDI outward flow:
|D. ln(gdppc)| -0.019 -0.085 ∗∗∗ 0.053 0.045 -0.003 0.011
(0.031) (0.031) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035)
Gh -0.034 0.119
∗∗ 0.174 ∗∗∗ -0.022 0.254 ∗∗∗ 0.246 ∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.056) (0.068) (0.058) (0.047)
Gd 0.066 0.161
∗∗∗ -0.107 0.041 0.010 0.019
(0.053) (0.048) (0.068) (0.075) (0.061) (0.057)
Gd ∗Gh 0.250 ∗∗∗ 0.047 0.328 ∗∗∗ 0.359 ∗∗∗ 0.216 ∗∗∗ 0.213 ∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.041) (0.041) (0.052) (0.042) (0.032)
# Observations 16305 16299 16304 16304 16305 16304
R2 0.442 0.436 0.449 0.445 0.444 0.449
Note: See the note of Table 1. Coefficient estimates for the remaining regressors omitted in the
report.
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Table 3: Positive bilateral FDI—inward stock; with FE controls
FDI inward stock VA PV GE RQ RL CC
|D. ln(gdppc)| -0.230 ∗∗∗ -0.314 ∗∗∗ -0.188 ∗∗∗ -0.236 ∗∗∗ -0.231 ∗∗∗ -0.198 ∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.037) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036)
Gd ∗Gh 0.174 ∗∗∗ -0.056 0.163 ∗∗∗ 0.109 ∗∗ 0.092 ∗∗ 0.113 ∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.038) (0.043) (0.049) (0.042) (0.031)
ln(distance) -0.973 ∗∗∗ -0.980 ∗∗∗ -0.980 ∗∗∗ -0.981 ∗∗∗ -0.975 ∗∗∗ -0.977 ∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
contig. 0.277 ∗∗ 0.285 ∗∗ 0.286 ∗∗ 0.290 ∗∗ 0.289 ∗∗ 0.289 ∗∗
(0.130) (0.129) (0.129) (0.130) (0.129) (0.129)
comlang 0.589 ∗∗∗ 0.589 ∗∗∗ 0.581 ∗∗∗ 0.593 ∗∗∗ 0.582 ∗∗∗ 0.587 ∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097)
colony 0.948 ∗∗∗ 0.973 ∗∗∗ 0.953 ∗∗∗ 0.957 ∗∗∗ 0.959 ∗∗∗ 0.941 ∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140)
comcol 0.365 ∗∗∗ 0.383 ∗∗∗ 0.401 ∗∗∗ 0.400 ∗∗∗ 0.405 ∗∗∗ 0.403 ∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135)
curcol 0.776 0.723 0.824 0.783 0.802 0.834
(0.916) (0.917) (0.936) (0.923) (0.925) (0.946)
smctry 0.497 ∗∗ 0.438 ∗∗ 0.457 ∗∗ 0.444 ∗∗ 0.457 ∗∗ 0.460 ∗∗
(0.220) (0.219) (0.220) (0.220) (0.219) (0.219)
rta 0.106 0.211 ∗∗∗ 0.176 ∗∗ 0.179 ∗∗ 0.189 ∗∗ 0.192 ∗∗
(0.080) (0.078) (0.078) (0.080) (0.078) (0.078)
comcur 0.102 0.126 0.157 0.139 0.141 0.154
(0.135) (0.135) (0.136) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135)
bit 0.001 -0.006 0.002 -0.012 -0.002 0.005
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Controls:
Home Country * Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination Country * Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
# Observations 25692 25677 25688 25688 25692 25688
R2 0.716 0.714 0.715 0.714 0.715 0.715
Note: See the note of Table 1.
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Table 4: Positive bilateral FDI—all stocks and flows; with FE controls
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
FDI inward stock:
|D. ln(gdppc)| -0.230 ∗∗∗ -0.314 ∗∗∗ -0.188 ∗∗∗ -0.236 ∗∗∗ -0.231 ∗∗∗ -0.198 ∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.037) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036)
Gd ∗Gh 0.174 ∗∗∗ -0.056 0.163 ∗∗∗ 0.109 ∗∗ 0.092 ∗∗ 0.113 ∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.038) (0.043) (0.049) (0.042) (0.031)
# Observations 25692 25677 25688 25688 25692 25688
R2 0.716 0.714 0.715 0.714 0.715 0.715
FDI outward stock:
|D. ln(gdppc)| -0.271 ∗∗∗ -0.397 ∗∗∗ -0.249 ∗∗∗ -0.276 ∗∗∗ -0.328 ∗∗∗ -0.257 ∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.036) (0.042) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042)
Gd ∗Gh 0.184 ∗∗∗ -0.126 ∗∗∗ 0.151 ∗∗∗ 0.138 ∗∗∗ 0.027 0.103 ∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.040) (0.046) (0.053) (0.044) (0.032)
# Observations 23323 23312 23323 23323 23323 23323
R2 0.721 0.720 0.720 0.720 0.719 0.720
FDI inward flow:
|D. ln(gdppc)| -0.213 ∗∗∗ -0.280 ∗∗∗ -0.146 ∗∗∗ -0.179 ∗∗∗ -0.228 ∗∗∗ -0.187 ∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.030) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035)
Gd ∗Gh 0.195 ∗∗∗ 0.024 0.222 ∗∗∗ 0.202 ∗∗∗ 0.087 ∗∗ 0.118 ∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.033) (0.038) (0.045) (0.037) (0.028)
# Observations 19905 19894 19898 19898 19905 19898
R2 0.643 0.640 0.642 0.642 0.641 0.641
FDI outward flow:
|D. ln(gdppc)| -0.223 ∗∗∗ -0.313 ∗∗∗ -0.197 ∗∗∗ -0.226 ∗∗∗ -0.271 ∗∗∗ -0.233 ∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.039) (0.037) (0.040) (0.040)
Gd ∗Gh 0.173 ∗∗∗ -0.048 0.158 ∗∗∗ 0.135 ∗∗∗ 0.036 0.071 ∗∗
(0.033) (0.037) (0.041) (0.049) (0.039) (0.030)
# Observations 16681 16675 16680 16680 16681 16680
R2 0.661 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.659
Controls:
Home Country * Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination Country * Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: See the note of Table 1. Coefficient estimates for the remaining regressors omitted in the report.
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Table 5: Zero augmented bilateral FDI—inward stock
FDI inward stock VA PV GE RQ RL CC
ln(gdpd) 0.650
∗∗∗ 0.713 ∗∗∗ 0.614 ∗∗∗ 0.635 ∗∗∗ 0.641 ∗∗∗ 0.640 ∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
ln(gdph) 0.626
∗∗∗ 0.648 ∗∗∗ 0.621 ∗∗∗ 0.639 ∗∗∗ 0.632 ∗∗∗ 0.633 ∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
ln(gdppcd) -0.023 -0.284
∗∗∗ -0.185 ∗∗ -0.229 ∗∗∗ -0.128 ∗ -0.158 ∗∗
(0.068) (0.075) (0.072) (0.074) (0.074) (0.071)
ln(gdppch) 0.281
∗∗∗ 0.252 ∗∗∗ 0.160 ∗∗ 0.256 ∗∗∗ 0.160 ∗∗ 0.132 ∗
(0.069) (0.076) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073)
|D. ln(gdppc)| -0.121 ∗∗∗ -0.250 ∗∗∗ -0.046 -0.023 -0.047 -0.097 ∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048)
ln(pd) -0.302
∗ -0.055 -0.315 ∗ -0.410 ∗∗ -0.276 ∗ -0.309 ∗
(0.178) (0.161) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) (0.167)
ln(ph) 1.899
∗∗∗ 1.799 ∗∗∗ 1.592 ∗∗∗ 1.718 ∗∗∗ 1.512 ∗∗∗ 1.495 ∗∗∗
(0.200) (0.176) (0.177) (0.176) (0.176) (0.176)
Gd -0.102 0.356
∗∗∗ 0.128 0.273 ∗∗ 0.032 0.130 ∗
(0.073) (0.070) (0.093) (0.106) (0.088) (0.078)
Gh -0.281
∗∗∗ -0.019 0.056 -0.259 ∗∗∗ 0.148 ∗ 0.216 ∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.067) (0.081) (0.091) (0.081) (0.068)
Gd ∗Gh 0.563 ∗∗∗ 0.183 ∗∗∗ 0.529 ∗∗∗ 0.650 ∗∗∗ 0.522 ∗∗∗ 0.374 ∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.058) (0.059) (0.072) (0.059) (0.045)
ln(distance) -0.610 ∗∗∗ -0.598 ∗∗∗ -0.640 ∗∗∗ -0.644 ∗∗∗ -0.620 ∗∗∗ -0.632 ∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.056) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054)
contig. 1.015 ∗∗∗ 1.082 ∗∗∗ 1.098 ∗∗∗ 1.116 ∗∗∗ 1.105 ∗∗∗ 1.078 ∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.182) (0.179) (0.180) (0.180) (0.179)
comlang 1.433 ∗∗∗ 1.463 ∗∗∗ 1.362 ∗∗∗ 1.428 ∗∗∗ 1.365 ∗∗∗ 1.318 ∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.127) (0.125) (0.125) (0.126) (0.126)
colony 1.341 ∗∗∗ 1.356 ∗∗∗ 1.369 ∗∗∗ 1.366 ∗∗∗ 1.359 ∗∗∗ 1.320 ∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.186) (0.186) (0.184) (0.190) (0.187)
comcol 0.525 ∗∗∗ 0.688 ∗∗∗ 0.456 ∗∗ 0.514 ∗∗∗ 0.510 ∗∗∗ 0.524 ∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.185) (0.180) (0.181) (0.181) (0.182)
curcol 0.307 0.431 0.656 ∗ 0.511 0.624 ∗ 0.896 ∗∗∗
(0.347) (0.329) (0.368) (0.412) (0.347) (0.323)
smctry 0.843 ∗∗∗ 0.676 ∗∗ 0.741 ∗∗ 0.754 ∗∗ 0.813 ∗∗∗ 0.812 ∗∗∗
(0.288) (0.292) (0.289) (0.292) (0.289) (0.288)
rta 0.037 0.280 ∗∗∗ 0.063 0.018 0.114 0.165
(0.107) (0.105) (0.103) (0.104) (0.104) (0.103)
comcur 0.726 ∗∗∗ 0.786 ∗∗∗ 0.799 ∗∗∗ 0.779 ∗∗∗ 0.747 ∗∗∗ 0.801 ∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.206) (0.203) (0.202) (0.204) (0.201)
bit 0.339 ∗∗∗ 0.247 ∗∗∗ 0.352 ∗∗∗ 0.273 ∗∗∗ 0.362 ∗∗∗ 0.407 ∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.085) (0.083) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084)
# Observations 36587 36483 36567 36567 36587 36567
# Zeroes 11613 11524 11597 11597 11613 11597
Note: See the note of Table 1.
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Table 6: Zero augmented bilateral FDI—all stocks and flows
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
FDI inward stock:
|D. ln(gdppc)| -0.121 ∗∗∗ -0.250 ∗∗∗ -0.046 -0.023 -0.047 -0.097 ∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048)
Gd -0.102 0.356
∗∗∗ 0.128 0.273 ∗∗ 0.032 0.130 ∗
(0.073) (0.070) (0.093) (0.106) (0.088) (0.078)
Gh -0.281
∗∗∗ -0.019 0.056 -0.259 ∗∗∗ 0.148 ∗ 0.216 ∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.067) (0.081) (0.091) (0.081) (0.068)
Gd ∗Gh 0.563 ∗∗∗ 0.183 ∗∗∗ 0.529 ∗∗∗ 0.650 ∗∗∗ 0.522 ∗∗∗ 0.374 ∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.058) (0.059) (0.072) (0.059) (0.045)
# Observations 36587 36483 36567 36567 36587 36567
# Zeroes 11613 11524 11597 11597 11613 11597
FDI outward stock:
|D. ln(gdppc)| -0.137 ∗∗∗ -0.274 ∗∗∗ -0.103 ∗∗ -0.102 ∗ -0.124 ∗∗ -0.127 ∗∗
(0.047) (0.046) (0.052) (0.054) (0.053) (0.052)
Gh -0.263
∗∗∗ 0.294 ∗∗∗ 0.609 ∗∗∗ -0.014 0.644 ∗∗∗ 0.679 ∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.072) (0.093) (0.107) (0.090) (0.076)
Gd -0.049 -0.038 -0.166
∗ 0.154 -0.198 ∗∗ -0.161 ∗∗
(0.076) (0.075) (0.099) (0.113) (0.093) (0.081)
Gd ∗Gh 0.519 ∗∗∗ 0.119 ∗ 0.442 ∗∗∗ 0.501 ∗∗∗ 0.394 ∗∗∗ 0.355 ∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.061) (0.063) (0.077) (0.062) (0.047)
# Observations 35257 35166 35256 35256 35257 35256
# Zeros 12464 12384 12463 12463 12464 12463
FDI inward flow:
|D. ln(gdppc)| 0.005 -0.079 ∗∗ 0.107 ∗∗ 0.101 ∗∗ 0.028 0.022
(0.037) (0.037) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.042)
Gd -0.204
∗∗∗ 0.394 ∗∗∗ -0.286 ∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.199 ∗∗ -0.055
(0.069) (0.062) (0.086) (0.097) (0.081) (0.072)
Gh 0.031 0.108
∗ 0.242 ∗∗∗ 0.020 0.391 ∗∗∗ 0.310 ∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.060) (0.073) (0.084) (0.073) (0.060)
Gd ∗Gh 0.472 ∗∗∗ 0.204 ∗∗∗ 0.531 ∗∗∗ 0.610 ∗∗∗ 0.366 ∗∗∗ 0.324 ∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.052) (0.055) (0.067) (0.055) (0.042)
# Observations 36340 36236 36315 36315 36340 36315
# Zeros 16926 16833 16908 16908 16926 16908
FDI outward flow:
|D. ln(gdppc)| -0.130 -0.390 ∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.109 -0.146 -0.113
(0.092) (0.093) (0.105) (0.106) (0.108) (0.104)
Gh -0.622
∗∗∗ 0.443 ∗∗∗ 0.605 ∗∗∗ -0.123 0.846 ∗∗∗ 0.738 ∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.150) (0.182) (0.210) (0.185) (0.151)
Gd -0.312
∗∗ -0.058 -0.959 ∗∗∗ -0.191 -0.631 ∗∗∗ -0.613 ∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.154) (0.204) (0.238) (0.189) (0.171)
Gd ∗Gh 1.145 ∗∗∗ 0.336 ∗∗ 0.988 ∗∗∗ 0.939 ∗∗∗ 0.714 ∗∗∗ 0.696 ∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.131) (0.125) (0.157) (0.127) (0.098)
# Observations 32925 32844 32912 32912 32925 32912
# Zeros 16620 16545 16608 16608 16620 16608
Note: See the note of Table 1. Coefficient estimates for the remaining regressors omitted in the
report.
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Table 7: Zero augmented bilateral FDI—inward stock; with FE controls
FDI inward stock VA PV GE RQ RL CC
|D. ln(gdppc)| -0.244 -0.370 ∗∗∗ -0.172 ∗∗∗ -0.233 -0.216 ∗∗∗ -0.192 ∗∗∗
(.) (0.037) (0.060) (0.671) (0.046) (0.044)
Gd ∗Gh 0.357 ∗∗∗ 0.000 0.309 0.263 0.235 ∗∗∗ 0.219 ∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.046) (.) (0.759) (0.050) (0.038)
ln(distance) -1.263 ∗∗∗ -1.276 ∗∗∗ -1.275 ∗∗∗ -1.282 -1.269 ∗∗∗ -1.271 ∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.054) (0.289) (3.689) (0.054) (0.054)
contig. 0.391 ∗∗ 0.414 ∗∗ 0.417 ∗∗ 0.425 0.420 ∗∗ 0.420 ∗∗
(0.166) (0.165) (0.189) (1.233) (0.165) (0.164)
comlang 0.821 ∗∗∗ 0.819 ∗∗∗ 0.811 ∗∗∗ 0.830 0.801 ∗∗∗ 0.815 ∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.119) (0.218) (2.391) (0.120) (0.119)
colony 1.416 ∗∗∗ 1.463 ∗∗∗ 1.436 ∗∗∗ 1.439 1.446 ∗∗∗ 1.413 ∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.181) (0.368) (4.146) (0.182) (0.182)
comcol 0.434 ∗∗∗ 0.492 ∗∗∗ 0.505 ∗∗ 0.512 0.518 ∗∗∗ 0.505 ∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.166) (0.202) (1.483) (0.165) (0.165)
curcol 1.197 ∗∗∗ 1.143 ∗∗∗ 1.306 ∗∗ 1.227 1.282 ∗∗∗ 1.334 ∗∗∗
(0.438) (0.440) (0.518) (3.557) (0.435) (0.426)
smctry 0.829 ∗∗∗ 0.705 ∗∗ 0.740 ∗∗ 0.719 0.744 ∗∗∗ 0.747 ∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.276) (0.322) (2.088) (0.275) (0.275)
rta 0.175 ∗ 0.381 ∗∗∗ 0.322 ∗∗∗ 0.309 0.336 ∗∗∗ 0.353 ∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.092) (0.116) (0.894) (0.092) (0.092)
comcur 0.490 ∗∗ 0.562 ∗∗∗ 0.615 ∗∗ 0.583 0.592 ∗∗∗ 0.612 ∗∗∗
(0.199) (0.198) (0.243) (1.689) (0.200) (0.200)
bit 0.187 ∗∗ 0.171 ∗∗ 0.193 ∗∗ 0.166 0.191 ∗∗∗ 0.201 ∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.073) (0.084) (0.484) (0.072) (0.072)
Controls:
Home Country * Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination Country * Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
# Observations 37688 37582 37668 37668 37688 37668
# Zeroes 11996 11905 11980 11980 11996 11980
Note: See the note of Table 1.
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Table 8: Zero augmented bilateral FDI—all stocks and flows; with FE controls
VA PV GE RQ RL CC
FDI inward stock:
|D. ln(gdppc)| -0.244 -0.370 ∗∗∗ -0.172 ∗∗∗ -0.233 -0.216 ∗∗∗ -0.192 ∗∗∗
(.) (0.037) (0.060) (0.671) (0.046) (0.044)
Gd ∗Gh 0.357 ∗∗∗ 0.000 0.309 0.263 0.235 ∗∗∗ 0.219 ∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.046) (.) (0.759) (0.050) (0.038)
# Observations 37688 37582 37668 37668 37688 37668
# Zeroes 11996 11905 11980 11980 11996 11980
FDI outward stock:
|D. ln(gdppc)| -0.289 -0.449 -0.273 ∗∗∗ -0.335 -0.335 -0.247 ∗∗∗
(.) (.) (0.051) (.) (.) (0.051)
Gd ∗Gh 0.325 ∗∗∗ -0.080 0.222 ∗∗∗ 0.158 ∗∗ 0.121 ∗∗ 0.202 ∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.050) (0.056) (0.067) (0.055) (0.041)
# Observations 36153 36060 36152 36152 36153 36152
# Zeroes 12830 12748 12829 12829 12830 12829
FDI inward flow:
|D. ln(gdppc)| -0.156 ∗∗∗ -0.259 ∗∗∗ -0.083 -0.110 ∗∗∗ -0.189 ∗∗∗ -0.150 ∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (39.70) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040)
Gd ∗Gh 0.358 ∗∗∗ 0.074 ∗ 0.325 0.334 ∗∗∗ 0.150 ∗∗∗ 0.168 ∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.039) (155.7) (0.050) (0.042) (0.033)
# Observations 37399 37293 37374 37374 37399 37374
# Zeroes 17494 17399 17476 17476 17494 17476
FDI outward flow:
|D. ln(gdppc)| -0.360 ∗∗∗ -0.650 ∗∗∗ -0.296 ∗∗∗ -0.425 ∗∗∗ -0.459 ∗∗∗ -0.364 ∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.088) (0.108) (0.105) (0.109) (0.108)
Gd ∗Gh 0.818 ∗∗∗ 0.037 0.589 ∗∗∗ 0.469 ∗∗∗ 0.311 ∗∗∗ 0.366 ∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.106) (0.112) (0.131) (0.106) (0.086)
# Observations 33716 33633 33703 33703 33716 33703
# Zeroes 17035 16958 17023 17023 17035 17023
Controls:
Home Country * Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Destination Country * Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Note: See the note of Table 1. Coefficient estimates for the remaining regressors omitted in the report.
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